Feature Article

Invisible Data Theft on IBM i - Detecting the Invisible

By Dan Riehl

How many times has your most sensitive data file been downloaded today?
For most of us, the honest answer is "I Don't Know."
That's Exactly Right! How could you possibly know?

Our great IBM i (iSeries and AS/400) has long been considered a security strongbox—a hacker's worst nightmare. Some even consider it to be unhackable. This gross misconception has caused some of us to become complacent in our due diligence related to the security and integrity of our systems and sensitive data. But IBM i security cannot rely upon it's perceived obscurity as sufficient protection in a world of potentially malicious insiders and highly trained and well-financed cyber criminals.

Securing the data on the IBM i is made especially difficult by our ubiquitous tools(e.g. FTP, ODBC, DDM) that access our data but leave no footprints. How can you reasonably expect to protect the sensitive information in your care when it can be accessed without your knowledge and without leaving ANY footprints?

Invisible Data Access Methods

When a thief steals your car, it's very easy to tell. Ug, it's not in your driveway. But how can you know when someone has stolen a sensitive database file? The file is still there and there are no traces of any access to the file. But, does that prove that the file hasn't been breached or stolen? Obviously NO.

IBM ships the IBM i with a variety of data access tools, many of which access data invisibly. We often add third-party data query tools, and we even write our own data access methods using socket programs and the database APIs. Although non-IBM data access tools might reside on your systems, I want to focus this article on the built-in or otherwise IBM-supplied tools that access data, and do not leave a trace of the activity.

If I download a database file using FTP or the IBM i Access for Windows file transfer utility, there's no built-in audit trail of that activity. There is no FTP log for the FTP server and no logging or history of IBM i Access for Windows file transfers. These file access and transfers are invisible, even to the system administrator. If I use one of these common tools to download an employee personnel file, a payroll file, a customer file, or any other file to my PC, you can't know it. Neither the IBM FTP server nor the IBM-supplied file transfer facility makes or keeps a record of that activity.

What about using ODBC applications, Distributed Data Management (DDM), and other data access methods shipped as part of IBM i? All data movement using these services is also invisible.

(Caveat: Database Journaling can be used to produce an audit trail of add, change and delete record level activity. But, if the data is accessed for "read-only" in order to steal the file(e.g. FTP or ODBC download of a file), there is no record level activity recorded, and no footprints to follow.)

What is your Security Culture?

I often visit IBM i customer sites to teach technical classes and perform IBM i security vulnerability assessments. In too many of these places, I find a shocking indifference to data security. While teaching a programming class at a rather large regional bank, class members didn't hesitate to volunteer that none of the bank's data was encrypted. Account numbers, Social Security numbers and Driver's License numbers, and even ATM PIN codes were stored as clear text in Customer Account files.

In another example, I was teaching an IBM i Security Workshop which was open to the public. During the workshop I referred to Payroll data as an example of data that must be secured from prying eyes. Two young men at the back of the classroom exchanged quizzical glances. When I asked if there was a question, one of them piped up and asked, "How are we supposed to know what to ask for on our next review if we don't know what the other people are making?" I was floored. These fellows were their company's top IBM i security staffers, and they felt it was just fine to pry into employee payroll data.

Building a strong Security and Compliance culture within the organization is critical to data security and privacy.

Security Through User Ignorance

If your users don't know how to use FTP and the IBM i Access File Transfer utility and don't understand ODBC and DDM, you might reason that their ignorance protects you. Further, you might believe that outside hackers don't care about your data. Let's examine these rationales.

Most of us have employees who came from other IBM i shops. It's not unusual to have a user who, from prior employment, knows applications by J.D. Edwards, Infor/Infinium/S2K/Lawson Software, BPCS, MAPICS or JDA Software. At their previous job, those employees might have learned the names of files and libraries for use with query tools or file upload and download tools. They might have routinely used FTP or IBM i Access for Windows file transfer. Many power users, such as data analysts and sales and marketing folks, are familiar with file names and libraries. In schools today, students are taught tools such as Microsoft Excel and Microsoft Access and learn how to use ODBC to directly access data.

And let's not ignore the technical staff. Programmers and operators, Help Desk, and Technical support people know how to use FTP, ODBC, and file transfers, and they know the names of the sensitive files.

How many salespeople leave your company to go to work for a competitor? How difficult would it be for them to tuck a USB drive loaded with customer information and sales activity reports into their pocket as they leave? While they're at it, they might get the pricing files, too. Or instead of a USB drive, maybe they just download the files and email them to a buddy who works for the competitor.

If you work in the healthcare industry, what would happen if your patient's personal health information were stolen and published on the Internet? Company financial data such as a retailer's comparative store sales can drive a stock up or down. Stealing such information and making it public before the company formally reports its earnings can be hugely profitable. But, thankfully, it is also illegal, as are other types of data theft.

You cannot rely on the technical ignorance of your employees and contractors to secure your sensitive data. They are likely not as ignorant as you might suspect.

I am not trying to impugn our fellow workers. But, under certain circumstances, I have seen even the most trusted employee succumb to the allure of a big pay day through stolen or manipulated data.

Object-Level Security Will Protect Me - Really?

IBM and industry pundits have long embraced the concept of object-level security, which stipulates that every user be granted access only to the files, programs, and other objects necessary to perform his or her job and receives only the minimum permissions needed to each object.

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